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ESTIMATING INCOME RESPONSES TO TAX 





Recent research on the behavioral effects of income taxes has to a large extent focused on the 
elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate, i.e., one minus the marginal tax 
rate. We offer new evidence on this matter by making use of a large panel of Swedish tax 
payers over the period 1991-2002. Changes in statutory tax rates as well as discretionary 
changes in tax bracket thresholds provide exogenous variations in tax rates that can be used to 
identify income responses. We estimate dynamic income models which allow us to 
distinguish between short-run and long-run effects in a straightforward fashion. The estimates 
of the long-run elasticity of income with respect to the net-of-tax rate typically hover in a 
range between 0.20 and 0.30. The short-run elasticities are in general smaller but less 
precisely estimated. We use the estimates to simulate the fiscal consequences of a tax reform 
that reduces the top marginal tax rate by five percentage points. Such a reform turns out to 
have negligible effects on tax revenues and may even yield a fiscal surplus. 
JEL Code: H24, H31, J22. 
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1. Introduction 
Research on the behavioral effects of labor taxation has largely focused on the impact on 
hours of work and labor force participation. More recently, a literature has emerged that 
focuses on the impact on taxable income and other measures of income. One reason for this 
new direction is that taxes may affect individual behavior along a number of margins in 
addition to the effects on hours of work and participation, such as work effort and job 
mobility. By examining the impact on income, one could arguably capture a wider set of 
responses than those studied in traditional labor supply studies. The new literature is mainly 
based on U.S. data and has so far not converged to a consensus view regarding the 
quantitative magnitudes of the behavioral responses. Studies of income responses to changes 
in tax rates have rarely focused on European experiences. 
 
The present paper makes several contributions to the empirical literature on income responses 
to marginal tax changes. First, we highlight the distinction between short-run and long-run 
responses by estimating dynamic models using panel data. Previous research has in general 
been vague as to whether the estimated elasticities of interest have pertained to the short run 
or the long run. In fact, the modeling approaches commonly used have not been adequate for 
distinguishing between short-run and long-run responses. Second, we examine behavioral 
differences between men and women, an issue where most of the previous literature has been 
silent. Third, our study provides the first comprehensive empirical analysis of the impact of 
Swedish tax changes subsequent to the major reforms in 1990-91. These changes have been 
targeted at high-income earners and involved tax hikes as well as tax cuts. 
 
We make use of a large panel data set that comprises information for 12 years, namely 1991-
2002. We identify the effects of income tax changes on income by exploiting two main 
sources of exogenous variations in the tax rules. First, changes in the statutory tax rates have 
occurred in 1995 as well as in 1999. Second, the “kinks” of the progressive tax schedule have 
been subject to discretionary changes which induce exogenous changes in marginal tax rates 
for a given level of income. 
 
The broad features of the Swedish tax system have remained largely intact since the early 
1990s, when the “tax reform of the century” was introduced. This major reform involved 
substantial simplifications and base broadening of the tax system. One key element was the 
introduction of a two-tiered marginal tax schedule for earned income. The idea was that most   3
income earners should pay only the proportional municipality tax (hovering around 30 
percent). For incomes above a certain threshold, a state tax kicked in at the marginal rate of 20 
percent. The state tax was raised to 25 percent in 1995. From 1999 and onwards, the state tax 
has comprised two levels, viz. 20 and 25 percent. 
 
A noteworthy element of the Swedish tax system is its treatment of the individual, rather than 
the family, as the basic tax unit. The tax schedule for earned income pertains to individual 
income and is independent of spousal income. Another notable element is the so-called dual 
income tax system, i.e., the fact that earned income and capital income are subject to different 
tax treatments: earned income is subject to progressive taxes whereas income from capital is 
taxed at the flat rate of 30 percent. 
 
The conventional approach to the estimation of income responses to tax changes has involved 
regressing changes in log income on changes in the log of the net-of-tax rate, where the net-
of-tax rate is defined as one minus the marginal tax rate. This regression framework in first 
differences is typically, implicitly or explicitly, derived from a relationship between the levels 
of income and marginal tax rate. However, the “difference specification” in the regression 
models implicitly assumes immediate adjustment to changes in tax policy. If the adjustment is 
gradual rather than immediate, the model is misspecified. 
 
Our approach also posits a relationship between income and tax rate levels but allows for 
lagged adjustment. This leads to an “error correction” specification which encompasses the 
conventional regression model as a special case and yields estimates of short-run as well as 
long-run responses. A dynamic specification can be rationalized from several considerations. 
First, there may be lags in the diffusion of information about changes in tax policy. Second, 
individual behavior may exhibit “habit persistence”, an idea that has a long tradition in studies 
of consumer demand. The hypothesis is that the individual gauges his consumption (or labor 
supply) against some benchmark that in part depends on her own behavior in the past.
1 Third, 
there may be costs associated with changes in hours worked.
 2 For example, a change in 
working time may require a switch to a new employer. Fourth, to the extent that tax changes 
affect human capital investment, the earnings response will not be immediate. 
                                                 
1 See Johnson and Pencavel (1984) for an empirical implementation of this idea in a study of labor supply. 
2 Formal models of dynamic labor supply with explicit costs of adjustment appear rarely in the literature. The 
paper by Nadiri and Roach (1974) is one of the exceptions.   4
Our estimates of the long-run income elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate typically 
range between 0.20 and 0.30. The estimates of the short-run elasticities are generally much 
smaller but are less well determined. The estimates for men are more robust than those for 
women. The estimates are used to simulate the implications for government revenues of a tax 
reform that reduces the top marginal tax rate by five percentage points. Such a reform turns 
out to have negligible effects on tax revenues and may even yield a fiscal surplus. An 
important reason for this outcome is the presence of interactions between income taxes and 
other taxes, such as payroll taxes. A cut in the top marginal tax rate brings about higher 
incomes which in turn are associated with higher tax revenues from income as well as payroll 
taxes. 
 
The paper proceeds by providing a brief overview of previous research. Section 3 describes 
the Swedish tax system and the data are described in section 4. The empirical analysis is 
presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Previous Research 
2.1 Theoretical Issues 
Recent research on income responses to tax changes has several forerunners. One strand 
consists of the large literature on labor supply which focuses on how taxes affect hours of 
work and labor force participation. This literature builds on the canonical model of labor 
supply, where wage rates are taken as given and individual choices are dictated by preferences 
and budget restrictions (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999, for a survey of this research). A 
smaller and more recent literature has examined how wage rates respond to changes in the tax 
system in imperfectly competitive labor markets. In this literature, hours of work are 
determined by the worker (as in the canonical model) or through some bargaining mechanism, 
whereas wages may be set by firms (as in efficiency wage models) or through individual or 
collective bargaining (as in search models or trade union models). 
 
The recent focus on how taxes affect income is motivated by the view that taxes may have a 
multitude of effects on individual behavior in addition to the traditional labor supply 
responses. This view emphasizes that traditional estimates of the labor supply responsiveness 
to tax rates may substantially underestimate the overall effect, the reason being that individual 
adjustments along other margins are ignored. Taxes may affect work effort, what type of jobs 
that are accepted, and incentives for geographical and occupational mobility. This line of   5
argument has been articulated by Martin Feldstein in a series of papers; see Feldstein (1995a, 
1995b, 1999). A normative conclusion that follows from this perspective is that tax distortions 
are more serious, the higher the elasticity of taxable income is with respect to changes in tax 
rates. Indeed, Feldstein (1999) shows that the elasticity can be used to compute the 
deadweight loss from income taxes. 
 
The literature on how wages are affected by the tax system in imperfect labor markets has 
paid particular attention to the role of higher tax progressivity, i.e., the impact of a rise in the 
marginal tax rate relative to the average tax rate. A common result in a variety of models is 
that higher tax progressivity leads to wage moderation, which in turn will bring about a fall in 
equilibrium unemployment. The intuition for this result is perhaps most easily seen in a 
bargaining model, where a higher marginal tax rate raises the cost of wage increases and leads 
the parties in the bargain to opt for lower wages. Although the result is reasonably robust 
across a variety of models and specific assumptions, it is not completely robust.
3 So in the end 
and as usual, empirical work is needed to establish how taxes affect wages, hours and labor 
income. By and large, the empirical literature tends to confirm that increased tax progressivity 
is conducive to wage moderation, but there are also some conflicting results.
4 
 
The normative implications of estimated elasticities of income with respect to tax rates will 
generally depend on what is assumed about labor market imperfections. High elasticities 
reflect potentially large tax distortions from the perspective of the traditional model. In a 
bargaining model, by contrast, a rise in the marginal tax rate that leads to wage moderation 
and to a decline in overall income may conceivably be welfare improving via the associated 
increase in employment. Indeed, there is typically an optimal degree of tax progressivity in 
models of imperfect labor markets; see Holmlund and Kolm (1995) and Sorensen (1999) for 
elaborations of this idea. 
 
The recent literature on income responses to tax rates has typically been framed within the 
context of the canonical model, where income responses are viewed as the outcome of 
individual labor supply choices rather than individual or collective bargaining. We make no 
                                                 
3 Contributions to the theoretical literature on taxes in imperfectly competitive labor markets include Hoel 
(1990), Koskela and Vilmunen (1996), Lockwood and Manning (1993), Pissarides (1998), Hansen (1999), 
Sorensen (1999), Fuest and Huber (2000) and Sandemann Rasmussen (2002). Bovenberg (2003) provides a 
comprehensive treatment. 
4 Contributions to the empirical literature include Lockwood and Manning (1993), Holmlund and Kolm (1995), 
Wulfsberg (1997) and Slok et al (2000).   6
attempt in this paper to identify the precise income-generating effects at work. In all 
likelihood, actual incomes are influenced partly by individual choice and partly by bargaining 
mechanisms. 
 
2.2 Empirical Research on Income Responses to Tax Changes 
The empirical literature on the responses of taxable income to changes in tax rates was 
pioneered by Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995a, 1995b). The key parameter of interest in 
their studies as well as in the subsequent literature was the elasticity of taxable income with 
respect to the net-of-tax rate, i.e., one minus the marginal tax rate. This elasticity – ETI for 
short – was found to be remarkably high in these early studies which exploited data from U.S. 
tax reforms in the 1980s. Lindsey reported ETIs in a range between 1.6 and 1.8, whereas 
Feldstein’s estimates ranged from 1.0 to 3 depending on the income definition used. 
 
The subsequent literature has addressed a number of pitfalls that plagued the seminal papers 
and also highlighted the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative specifications and data. A 
crucial issue has been to separate the impact of tax policy from other factors that may have 
affected the evolution of incomes. In the US, cuts in marginal tax rates among high-income 
earners occurred concomitantly with rising income inequality, a development that easily can 
produce large ETI estimates even absent much impact from tax policy. The contributors 
following Lindsey’s and Feldstein’s papers have typically arrived at much smaller ETIs than 
their predecessors. There is, however, substantial variation in the reported estimates. 
 
The post-Feldstein contributions to the U.S. literature include papers by Auten and Carroll 
(1999), Samartino and Weiner (1997), Gruber and Saez (2002), Kopczuk (2005), Saez (2003), 
Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) and Giertz (2006). Giertz (2004) provides a recent survey of this 
literature. These studies typically adopt instrumental variables estimation of “difference 
specifications”, i.e., they regress changes in income on changes in the net-of-tax share while 
treating the tax variable as endogenous. A very brief summary of the results reads as follows: 
(i) ETI is typically positive, although not always so; (ii) ETI is typically well below unity, 
although not always so; (iii) the “preferred estimates” are typically located in a range between 
0.2 and 0.5. 
 
Three studies have examined the effects of the Swedish tax reform 1990-91, viz. Hansson 
(2007), Ljunge and Ragan (2005) and Selén (2002). These studies adhere to the conventional   7
difference specification and report estimates of ETI in a range between 0.2 and 0.4. Selén also 
briefly looks at the tax reforms during the 1990s and reports estimates of ETI close to zero. A 
study on Norwegian data by Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) present ETI estimates close to zero, 
hovering between -0.6 and 0.2. 
 
Despite a good deal of research, there is thus considerable dispersion of the estimates. The 
reasons for the differences are not well understood. The definition of income seems to matter, 
but it is not clear exactly how and why. The results are sensitive to sample selection rules, but 
exactly how remains unclear. And the strategies employed to control for exogenous income 
trends seem to affect the results. 
 
3. The Swedish Tax System 
A major tax reform took place in Sweden in 1990 and 1991 (see Agell et al, 1996, for details). 
The reform involved broadening of the tax bases and cuts of the statutory marginal income 
tax rates. An important ingredient was the introduction of a dual income tax, where earned 
income and income from capital were taxed according to different schedules. The new 
proportional capital income tax, levied on dividends, interest income and capital gains, was 
set to 30 percent and has remained at this level. The tax on earned income consists of two 
parts, one “local” and one national. The local income tax – determined by the local and 
regional governments – is proportional to income (above a basic deduction) but varies across 
localities. In 1991, the national average of the local income tax rates stood at 31 percent. On 
top of the local income tax, a national (state) tax kicked in at a rate of 20 percent for earned 
taxable incomes above 170,000 SEK, which corresponded to the 75
th percentile of the 
distribution of taxable incomes.
5 By 1991, the income tax schedule pertaining to earned 
income thus involved two brackets with (average) marginal rates of 31 and 51 percent. 
 
Although the main features of the new tax system have remained intact over the following 
years, several changes have taken place. One important change took place in 1995 when the 
national tax rate was raised to 25 percent. This system was modified 1999 when two brackets 
– 20 and 25 percent – for the national tax was introduced. This basic structure remains in 
place as of 2007. By 1999, the top rate kicked in at the 95
th percentile of the distribution of 
                                                 
5 Based on register data (LINDA) for individuals aged 20-59 with positive taxable income.   8
taxable incomes.
6 Table B1 in Appendix B describes in detail the evolution of tax bracket 
thresholds over the period 1991-2002. 
 
We use mainly two sources of exogenous variations in tax policies that should enable 
identification of behavioral responses. A first source is the changes in the statutory national 
tax rate: the increase from 20 to 25 percent in 1995 and the introduction in 1999 of a two-
bracket system. The 1999 reform implied that some individuals actually experienced cuts in 
the marginal tax rate since the threshold for the 25 percent rate was increased. A second 
source is the discretionary changes in the income thresholds which determine when the 
national tax kicks in; tax payers close to the threshold may be exposed to changes in the 
marginal tax rate through these bracket adjustments. 
 
One might also wish to consider a few other ingredients of the tax system, such as changes in 
the proportional local tax rates. However, the local tax rates have changed very little over the 
studied period; the averages have hovered between 30 and 31 percent. Actual individual local 
tax rates are affected by mobility decisions and should be treated as endogenous. 
 
Taxable income is obtained after various deductions from gross income. First, there are 
work-related deductions that may be requested by the tax payers and will be scrutinized by 
the tax authorities. Expenses caused by travel to work are the typical examples; such 
expenses are deductible if they exceed a certain amount. To arrive at taxable income, two 
further deductions are undertaken without any involvement by the tax payer. There is a 
“basic deduction” (grundavdrag) and there are social security fees that have been partly or 
wholly deductible. The basic deduction varies with the level of assessed income
7 up to a 
ceiling and takes a hump-shaped pattern, whereby the effective marginal tax rate is reduced 
at low incomes and increased over a range of incomes higher up in the distribution. 
Employee social security fees became increasingly important during the 1990s and had 
reached 7 percent of assessed income by the end of the decade. These fees are proportional 
up to a ceiling beyond which the marginal rate is zero. They involve some actuarial elements, 
however, and should not be treated as entirely analogous to ordinary taxes. 
 
                                                 
6 Based on register data (LINDA) for individuals aged 20-59 with positive taxable income. 
7 Assessed income is gross income minus work-related deductions. More information on income definitions are 
given below.   9
In addition to the abovementioned ingredients of the tax system, there are some progressive 
features in the systems for housing allowances and child care fees. We have no information 
at our disposal regarding how these characteristics vary across individuals in our data set. 
 
4. The Data 
The data come from a longitudinal data base, LINDA, which is a 3.35 percent random sample 
of the Swedish population. LINDA is based on a combination of several registers, for 
example income tax registers and population censuses.
8 From this data base, all individuals 
aged 20 to 59 are extracted for 12 consecutive years, viz. from 1991 to 2002. We focus on the 
years following the major tax reform of 1990-91, thus avoiding the complications associated 
with the changes in capital income taxation that were part of that reform. This procedure gives 
us around 160,000 individuals per year, and in total around 1.9 million observations. An 
individual is on average observed 9.4 times, 113,904 individuals are observed all 12 years, 
and there are 204,276 unique individuals. When allowing for lags, the period of estimation 
will be 1993-2002. 
 
In addition to rich information on incomes, the data include information on human capital 
attributes as well as some demographic characteristics (such as age, gender, education and 
marital status). We have added information on local labor market conditions, measured as the 
ratio between the number of vacancies and the number of unemployed.
9 Labor market 
conditions matter for bargaining outcomes and influence the risk of being quantity-
constrained in labor supply decisions. 
 
The fraction of tax payers affected by the national tax has hovered between 19 and 26 percent 
over the period 1991-2002. The top national rate of 25 percent has affected around 5 percent 
of the tax payers since its introduction in 1999. Although there have been no drastic changes 
in the statutory income tax rates, the changes that have occurred as well as “bracket 
switching” entail a non-trivial number of tax changes that can be taken as exogenous to 
                                                 
8 For a description of LINDA, see Edin and Fredriksson (2000). 
9 We are grateful to Kerstin Johansson for giving us access to these data. The local labor market is based on the 
commuting patterns of individuals in 284 municipalities of Sweden, resulting in 100 local labor markets. The 
tightness measure is defined as the number of vacant jobs divided by the number of job seekers registered at the 
public employment offices. The number of job seekers is the sum of the stock of openly unemployed and the 
stock of participants in active labor market programs.    10
individual behavior. To illustrate, consider a measure of the change in the individual marginal 
tax rate,  ˆit τ Δ , of the form 
 
(1)  [ ] ( ) 11 1 ˆ (1 ); ; it it t it t Yg z Y z ττ τ −− − Δ= + −  
 
where subscript i refers to individual i,  1 it Y −  refers to taxable income as of year t-1, g is the 
general growth in incomes and  t z  (as well as  1 t z − ) captures the tax code. The first term on the 
right-hand side is the predicted marginal tax rate pertaining to year t and the second term is 
the actual marginal tax rate in year t-1. Eq. (1) gives a measure of the change in the marginal 
tax rate that is independent of fluctuations in the individual income level. Over the period 
1992-2002, there are around 90,000 observations where  ˆ 0.05 it τ Δ≥  holds, i.e., where the 
marginal tax rate increases or decreases by at least 5 percentage points. All these changes take 
place in the upper half of the income distribution and two thirds of them occur in 1995 and 
1999, i.e., the years when changes in the statutory tax rates kick in.
10 Over 70 percent of these 
changes pertain to men. 
 
An analogous measure for changes in average tax rates reveals very little action in the data: 
tax policies have had almost negligible effects on average tax rates over the studied period. 
There are only some 20 observations where the (predicted) average tax rate increases or 
decreases by more than 5 percentage points and around 1,500 observations where the changes 
exceed 3 percentage points. Although some individuals are exposed to substantial changes in 
actual average tax rates, these changes are to an overwhelming degree driven by income 
shocks rather than by changes in tax policy. These observations suggest that it will be difficult 
to achieve credible identification of income responses to changes in average tax rates. 
 
There are a number of income variables in the data. We focus on labor income and 
entrepreneurial income, with or without associated taxable transfer payments, and exclude 
income from capital and capital gains.
11 Most social transfers are taxed as labor income; this 
includes for example unemployment benefits and sickness benefits. 
 
                                                 
10 The local tax rate is set at the national average in these calculations. The measure is thus not affected by 
changes in tax rates that are due to residential mobility.  
11 Entrepreneurial income captures self-employment income associated with unincorporated businesses. Owners 
of incorporated businesses receive their compensation in the form of wages and salaries.   11
We consider mainly three income concepts: (i) earned income (YE), which includes labor 
income and but excludes social transfers; broad income (YB), which includes taxable transfers 
in addition to earned income; and assessed income (YA), which equals broad income minus 
work-related deductions. We do not explicitly examine movements in taxable income (YT), 
the reason being that taxable income is essentially a nonlinear function of the other income 
variables. As mentioned, taxable income equals assessed income minus deductions that are 
determined by the tax authorities. The basic deduction depends on assessed income and the 
(partly deductible) social security fee is capped at a level that depends on broad income.
12  
 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics concerning the various income variables. Earned 
income exhibits much more variation than the other income variables, a fact that reflects that 
transfers are excluded from earned income but included in the other income measures. 
Transfers produce a sizeable level difference between broad income and earned income; the 
average difference between the two measures amounts to almost 10 percent (not shown in the 
table). The correlation matrix reveal a high degree of correlation between changes in broad 
income and assessed income but more modest correlations between earned income and the 
other income variables. 
 
The fraction of people with positive earned income has hovered between 85 and 87 percent 
over the period 1993-2002. The fraction fell sharply (from 91 to 86 percent) over the period 
1991-1993, when a deep recession hit the Swedish economy. The fraction with positive broad 
income has been around 95 percent over the period 1993-2002. The fraction of 
entrepreneurial income in earned income is 6 percent on average. Women accounts for 49 
percent of the sample. See Table B2 in Appendix B for more information on the sample. 
 
The income distribution has widened over the period. Table 2 shows the evolution of incomes 
by various percentiles. For earned income, the growth in nominal income has been 25 percent 
for the 10
th percentile and 60 percent for the 99
th percentile. Adjusted for inflation, these 
numbers correspond to roughly 5 and 40 percent real income growth. Aside from these 
divergent trends at the bottom and the top, there are modest increases in income inequality in  
 
                                                 
12 In LINDA, these three measures correspond to (i) primärinkomst (CPRIM), (ii) sammanräknad 
förvärvsinkomst (CSFVI) and (iii) taxerad förvärvsinkomst. Taxable income corresponds to beskattningsbar 
förvärvsinkomst in LINDA.   12
        Table 1. Income correlations and other statistics, 1991-2002. 
 ln  YE ln  YB ln YA  ln YT 
       
ln YE 1.000       
       
ln YB 0.727 
[0.560] 
1.000    
       





       
















       








       
# observations  1 660 041  1 828 182  1 827 065  1 794 674 
Notes: The total number of observations is 1 913 038. The last row report the number of observations with 
positive YE, YB, YA and YT, respectively. Numbers in brackets refer to first differences of log incomes. The age 
range is 20-59. 
 
the major part of the distribution. These broad patterns hold for both men and women as well 
as for all four measures of income. 
 
Previous research, largely based on U.S. data, has often tried to identify income responses to 
cuts in marginal tax rates by using data showing sharply widening income differentials. A 
difficulty that arises in this setting is to separate the effects of tax cuts from other 
determinants of increasing income dispersion. If the tax cuts are concentrated at the top, there 
is an obvious risk that the income responses will be overstated. The risk of overestimating the 
income responses should be smaller in the Swedish setting. The main statutory tax change has 
involved a tax hike rather than a tax cut for top incomes, something that would tend to 
underestimate rather than overestimate the income responses absent suitable controls for 
rising income differentials. We will, however, also control for trend changes in the income 
distribution. 
   13
      Table 2. The evolution of income by percentiles, 1991-2002. 
  p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 
Taxable         
1991  10.77 11.33 11.75 12.06 12.33 12.54 12.98 

















Assessed         
1991  10.95 11.50 11.85 12.11 12.37 12.57 13.00 

















Broad         
1991  10.97 11.51 11.86 12.12 12.39 12.59 13.03 

















Earned         
1991  10.31 11.32 11.83 12.12 12.40 12.60 13.04 

















 Note: The table shows nominal incomes (in natural logarithms) and income changes in percent. Over the period 
  1991-2002, the consumer price index increased by 20.0 percent. 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Empirical Strategy 
The previous empirical literature in this area has typically employed panel data and regressed 
changes in log income on changes in the log of the net-of-tax rate. A few other covariates are 
usually also included. Our specification is a generalization of this benchmark formulation 
where the benchmark obtains as a special case. The basic model is specified as a dynamic 
income equation of the form 
 
(2)  12 111 2 1 it it it it it it i it yn n X Xy α ββ γ γ ρ η ε −− − =+ + + + + ++ 
 
where  it y  is log income pertaining to individual i in year t and  ln(1 ) it it n τ ≡ −  is the log of the 
net-of-tax rate, where  it τ  is the marginal tax rate. it X  is a vector of other regressors,  i η  is an   14
individual-specific fixed effect and  it ε  is a mean zero random error term. The short-run effect 
of interest is captured by  1 β  and the long-run effect is given by  12 () / ( 1 ) β βρ + − , where the 
presumption is that  (0,1) ρ ∈  holds. Although there is often a presumption that the response is 
stronger in the long run than in the short run, the specification is not restrictive in that respect. 
The response may be stronger in the short run than in the long run for a variety of reasons. For 
example, if a tax hike increases tax avoidance, this may well be a “one-time effect” rather 
than a gradual adjustment. Adjustments driven by habit persistence or adjustment costs may 
entail more gradualness. 
 
Our specification incorporates “mean reversion” in the sense that income changes in a period 
are related to the previous period’s distance from long-run equilibrium. In other words, the 
model has an error correction specification which can be written as follows: 
 








Δ=Δ+ Δ + − − + + + + ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
 
 
where  12 β ββ ≡+ and  12 γ γγ ≡+. The squared brackets include the error correction term 
which is zero in long-run equilibrium. Shocks to income are offset through lagged adjustment 
towards equilibrium provided that  (0,1) ρ ∈  holds. 
 
The individual-specific fixed effects can be removed by first differencing. We obtain 
 
(4)  12 111 2 1 it it it it it it it ynn XX y β βγ γ ρ ε −− − Δ=Δ+Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ 
 




11 2 1 1 1 2 1 it it it it it it it yn n X X y β ββ γ γ ρ ε −− − Δ = Δ + + Δ +Δ +Δ + Δ +Δ  
 
The remainder error term and the differenced lagged dependent variable is correlated (since 
the former contains  1 it ε −  and the latter  1 it y − ). Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggested the use of 
either  2 it y −  or  22 3 it it it y yy −−− Δ= − as instrument for  1 it y − Δ ; such instruments are valid as long   15
as  it ε  is not serially correlated. The use of  2 it y −  as instrument is known as the “level” form of 
the Anderson and Hsiao estimator, whereas the use of  2 it y − Δ  is referred to as the “difference” 
estimator. An advantage of the level estimator is that we can exploit data available from year 
t=3 and onwards (since  2 it y −  is available from t=3), whereas the difference estimator is not 
available until t=4 (since  2 it y − Δ  is first available at year t=4).
13 Since the validity of  2 it y −  as 
instrument is conditional on absence of serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term,  it ε , it 
becomes important to test for serial correlation. We use the Arrelano-Bond tests of first- and 
second-order correlation in the differenced residuals. Absence of serial correlation in  it ε  
would imply negative first-order autocorrelation as well as zero second-order correlation in 
it ε Δ . 
 
An endogeneity problem specific to the problem at hand concerns the net-of-tax rate. This 
variable is clearly endogenous when the tax system is progressive. In general, we can write 
the net-of-tax rate as a function  ( ; ) it it t nn y z = , where  t z  captures the tax code.
14 
Analogously,  11 1 (;) it it t nn y z −− − = . It is obvious that  it n  is endogenous because it depends on 
income in the current period. However, it is clear that  1 it n −  is also correlated with the error 
term in (4) since it contains lagged income. To deal with these issues we construct two 






it it t nn yz − =  
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−  are predicted taxable incomes pertaining to period t and t-1, 
respectively. These predictions are based on observed taxable incomes in year t-2. We inflate 
2 it y −  by the growth of median income between year t-2 and t (as well as between t-2 and t-
1).
15 The model is thus exactly identified. 
                                                 
13 Arellano (1989) reports that the estimator that uses instruments in levels has much smaller variances than the 
difference estimator. 
14 In the regressions,  it y  stands for log income. With some abuse of notation, we let  it y  represent the level of 
income when discussing instruments. 
15 The national averages of the 284 local tax rates are applied when constructing the instruments since the actual 
local tax rate is endogenous to mobility decisions. For 2000-2002 we add the national average of the “church   16
 
Our data comprise 12 years, i.e., 1991 through 2002. We employ the Anderson-Hsiao level 
estimator in order to maximize the number of time periods and thus end up with 10 years 
covering the period 1993-2002. 
 
Comparisons with Conventional Specifications 
How is our approach related to the specifications used in previous work? A conventional 
specification involves regressing the change in income against the change in the net-of-tax 
rate and lagged levels of other covariates, i.e., 
 
(6)  1 it it it it y nX v β γ − Δ= Δ+ + 
 
This is the benchmark specification in Auten and Caroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002) 
as well as several other studies. However, it is also commonly argued that it is important to 
control for first-period income and thus include the lagged income level as an additional 
regressor, i.e., 
 
(7)  11 it it it it it yn y Xv β κγ −− Δ= Δ+ + +  
 
The lagged income variable may appear in a linear fashion as in (7) and in Auten and Carroll 
(1999), or as a flexible spline function as in Gruber and Saez (2002). The inclusion of lagged 
income among the right-hand side variables is typically motivated by mean reversion 
arguments, i.e., the need to control for the possibility that large positive (negative) shocks to 
income in a particular year are offset by slow (fast) income growth in subsequent years.
16 The 
endogeneity of  it n Δ  is recognized and the typical procedure is to instrument by means of 




it it t nn yz − =  is 
used. The conventional specification is “implicitly dynamic” since it uses lagged income as 
instrument. 
                                                                                                                                                          
fee” (kyrkoavgiften) to the national average of the local tax rate so as to get a consistently defined instrument 
over the whole period. During 1991-1999, the church tax is included in the local tax rate. When the church was 
separated from the state in 2000, this tax was converted to a fee for members of the church. The church fee has 
amounted to slightly less than one percent of taxable income. Close to 80 percent of the population are members 
of the Swedish church. 
16 Blomquist and Selin (2007) motivate the inclusion of lagged income by arguing that it serves as a proxy for 
unobserved heterogeneity that interacts with time.   17
 
We see at least two potential problems with this conventional approach. First, it fails to make 
a clear distinction between short-run and long-run effects. A common view seems to be that 
the parameter on  it n Δ  should capture long-run effects, at least if the time differencing 
encompasses several years. This interpretation is problematic since the inclusion of lagged 
income implies a feedback effect that should be accounted for when computing the long-run 
response. A second issue concerns the econometric methodology. The validity of  1 it y −  as an 
instrument requires that there is no first-order autocorrelation in  it v . This condition seems to 
have been largely ignored in the previous literature; in fact, we are unaware of any previous 
study in this area that presents autocorrelation tests.
17 For reasons discussed above, lagged 
income is plausibly correlated with the error term and thus needs to be instrumented. 
 
To what extent can the conventional difference model be nested as a special case of our 
dynamic specification? Specification (7) is not nested within (4) since it includes  1 it y −  rather 
than  1 it y − Δ . Specification (6) can however be nested within (4) after suitable modifications. 
By imposing  2 0 β ρ ==  in (4), we obtain a specification that is identical to (6) except for the 
treatment of the non-tax covariates included in the X-vector. A slight generalization of the 
treatment of the X-variables makes it possible to get reasonably congruent specifications. 
Note that  11 2 it it XX γ γ − Ψ≡Δ +Δ  in (4) obtains as a special case of 
*
11 2 2 it it it XX X γ λγ −− Ψ≡ + −  when  21 λ γγ = − . The specification in (6) is then obtained if 
12 0 γ γ == . In order to avoid possible endogeneity of some covariates, we exclude potentially 
endogenous t-dated covariates. In particular, variables representing education and marital 
status appear only as lagged levels, i.e., as  1 it X −  and  2 it X − . 
 
In summary, the conventional specification can be nested a special case of our general 
dynamic model. The key restrictions are  2 0 β ρ = = . Moreover, it is important to test for 
serial correlation when estimating the conventional model as well as our general dynamic 
model. 
 
                                                 
17 Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) do however discuss the likelihood of correlation between the error term and 
lagged income. Some of the previous studies have used two-wave panels which have precluded tests of 
autocorrelation of the differenced error term.   18
5.2 Empirical Results 
We focus on statutory marginal tax rates. These are the tax rates that apply to taxable income 
and consist of the local tax rate plus the national tax. A broader concept, which arguably may 
be thought of as representing the effective marginal tax rate, recognizes income-dependent 
basic deductions and social security fees. A well-informed agent, behaving according to the 
canonical labor supply model, would care about effective tax rates rather than the statutory 
ones. But the rules concerning deductions and fees are complex and it is not clear that they are 
well understood by the tax payers. The statutory rules, however, are simple since they involve 
only two or three brackets. It may well be the case that the statutory rules come closer than 
the effective rates to what agents perceive as relevant for their decisions. Ultimately, this is an 
empirical issue. The major changes in the tax system over the studied period are associated 
with changes in statutory rates and bracket adjustments. By Occam's razor we opt for the 
simpler alternative and focus on results based on statutory tax rates. Some results for effective 
tax rates are shown in Appendix A. 
 
The tax reforms we study have been relevant for individuals well above median earnings. 
Recall that only 20-25 percent of the tax payers have been affected by the national tax and 
only around 5 percent by the top bracket in place since 1999. There is no obvious criterion, 
however, for choosing the appropriate limit for sample inclusion. Although the changes in the 
marginal tax rates have been most pronounced among people with relatively high incomes, an 
exclusive focus on these groups would weaken identification. And inclusion of all income 
levels would imply an implausible degree of homogeneity in behavior across the 
distribution.
18 We have settled for a rule that includes individuals with above-median income 
in the beginning of the studied period. A cutoff rule that depends on income in the first 
available year (1991) minimizes the risk of choosing a sample based on endogenous 
outcomes. However, income is volatile and sample inclusion based on only one year’s income 
will miss individuals who have experienced temporary income cuts in that year. We have 
therefore computed average taxable income for each individual over the years 1991-94 (for 
those with positive incomes in each of those four years) and include in our sample only those 
with above-median average incomes. Recall that there is no major tax change before 1995. 
                                                 
18 There is some evidence from U.S. studies that high-income earners exhibit stronger responsiveness to tax 
changes; see Gruber and Saez (2002).   19
The robustness checks that we have undertaken, and which will be presented below, do not 
indicate that the results are very sensitive to the choice of cutoff point.
 19 
 
Results for the gender-pooled sample are set out in Table 3. The estimates correspond to eq. 
(2), estimated as first differences as given by eq. (4′). In addition to the tax variables, we 
include as covariates age squared, local labor market tightness and dummies for marital 
status, education and year.
20 We also include controls for changes in the income distribution 
that are unrelated to tax policy. These controls are produced by interacting log taxable income 
in 1991 with polynomial trends.
21 
 
       Table 3. Estimation results, gender-pooled sample. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Assessed  income  Broad  income Earned  income 
      
2






      






      






      






      
AR(1)  -34.73 -32.39  -44.37 
      
AR(2)  1.67 0.89  -1.01 
      
Obs.  621,185 621,560  585,576 
Notes: The model is estimated in first differences (Anderson-Hsiao using lagged levels as instruments). The t-
statistics in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-individual correlation. Other variables 
are three education categories, marital status, local labor market tightness and year dummies. Lagged income and 
the two tax variables are treated as endogenous and instrumented as described in the text. Controls for trends in 
the income distribution by means of interactions between income 1991 and trend polynomials as described in the 
text. The Arellano-Bond statistics, AR(1) and AR(2) are asymptotically N(0,1) and test for first- and second-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The sample inclusion rule is based on average taxable 
income during 1991-94; observations above the median are included. 
 
 
                                                 
19 The results for men are broadly similar if median income in 1991 is used as cutoff rule. The results for women 
differ, however: the estimated income responsiveness to tax changes is much smaller with the 1991 cutoff rule. 
The reasons for these differences are not clear but may reflect higher income volatility among women.  
20 The linear age effect is not identified. Education levels (three dummies) as well as marital status are included 
as lagged levels (one and two years). The data contain information on the number of children in the household 
but the definitions are not entirely consistent over the years. We have therefore excluded this variable from the 
regression models but the results are almost identical if the variable is included. 
21 We interact (in the level specification) log taxable income 1991 with three trend variables (linear, squared and 
cubic trends), thus allowing the trend evolution of income to differ depending on income in 1991.    20
Some general remarks are in order before discussing details. First, the instruments are strong 
as judged by very high F-values for inclusion of the instruments in the first stage. Second, the 
IV-estimates reported in the tables are very different from the OLS results (not reported). 
OLS yields negative and large coefficients on the net-of-tax rates, whereas IV generally yields 
positive estimates. These differences are as should be expected given a progressive tax system 
where the net-of-tax rate is decreasing in income. Third, it worth noting that the lagged 
dependent variables always enter with coefficients in the range between 0.2 and 0.5, 
significantly different from zero as well as significantly different from unity. 
 
The point estimates of the long-run elasticities vary in a range between 0.22 and 0.32 
depending on the definition of income. All these estimates are significantly different from 
zero. The tests for autocorrelation reveal negative first-order but no second-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals. These patterns are consistent with zero 
autocorrelation in the residuals in levels. 
 
The estimated short-run elasticities are not significantly different from zero for assessed and 
broad income. For earned income, the short-run and the long-run elasticities are not 
significantly different from each other (the p-value for equal elasticities is 0.46). 
 
Separate results for men and women are shown in Table 4. The estimated long-run elasticities 
for assessed and broad income are very similar for men and women, whereas the elasticity for 
earned income is much higher for men than for women. In fact, the female long-run elasticity 
is not quite significant even after imposing a restriction,  2 0 β = , on the coefficients on the tax 
variables (column 7). (The restriction is not rejected.) For men there is some evidence of 
second-order autocorrelation in the differenced residual in two out the three cases. The 
estimates of the short-run impact vary substantially. For women, the estimated short-run 
impact is in fact negative. A negative short-run response may be consistent with some models 
of human capital accumulation where workers invest in education by reducing their working 
time. It would be farfetched, however, to propose such an interpretation without much 
stronger evidence. 
   21
Table 4. Estimation results by gender. 
 Men  Women 
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AR(1)  -29.45  -27.64  -32.84 -18.58 -17.01 -30.98  -32.22 
            
AR(2)  2.96  2.12 -0.16 -1.64  -1.74  -1.08 -1.11 
            
Obs.  427,873  428,084  404,045 193,312 193,476 181,531  181,531 
Notes: In column (7), the restriction  2 0 β =  is imposed which implies that the parameters pertaining to 
2
it n Δ  




How sensitive are these results to the chosen cutoff rules for sample inclusion? We consider 
two alternative cutoff rules based on average taxable income over the period 1991-94. The 
lower cutoff – 125,000 SEK – corresponds to the 40
th percentile of taxable income 1991-94; 
the higher cutoff – 150,000 SEK – is fairly close to the 60
th percentile. The results are shown 
in Table 5 and indicate somewhat higher long-run elasticities for the higher cutoff case. The 
short-run elasticities are never significantly negative when using the higher cutoff, arguably a 
plausible outcome. For earned income, the estimated short-run and long-run elasticities 
remain close to identical. 
   22
Table 5. Estimation results for alternative cutoff rules, gender-pooled sample 
  Mean income 1991-94 at least 125 000 SEK  Mean income 1991-94 at least 150 000 SEK
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AR(1)  -37.92 -35.42  -51.71  -33.13  -30.68  -39.59 
            
AR(2)  -2.18 1.38  -1.81  2.10  1.25 0.12 
            
Obs.  740,326 740,718  692,694  535,978  536,343  507,385 
Note: The cutoff rules pertain to average taxable incomes over the period 1991-94. See also notes to Table 3. 
 
We have undertaken a number of other sensitivity tests. As shown in Table 6, the results are 
reasonably robust to the inclusion or exclusion of various non-tax covariates. The estimated 
long-run elasticities are not much affected by exclusion of the trends that control for the 
widening of the income distribution. Nor are the estimates much affected by exclusion of 
other variables, such as education, marital status and local labor market conditions. The age 
limit makes a difference, however: the estimated long-run elasticities are consistently smaller 
when we restrict the sample to the prime-aged groups. 
 
In summary, the estimates of the long-run elasticity of income with respect to the net-of-tax 
rate typically range from 0.2 to 0.3. The results for men are somewhat more robust than the 
results for women. It should be noted, however, that the tax changes we have studied have 
affected many more men than women since they have been targeted at high-income earners. It 
should therefore generally be easier to identify behavioral responses among men than among 
women. Table 6. Further robustness checks, gender-pooled sample. 
 Assessed  income  Broad  income Earned  income 
 Long-run 
elasticity 
AR(1) AR(2)  Long-run 
elasticity 
AR(1) AR(2)  Long-run 
elasticity 
AR(1) AR(2) 





-34.73 1.67  0.316 
(5.34) 
-32.39 0.89  0.220 
(2.98) 
-44.37 -1.01 
              
No trends  0.310 
(4.00) 
-58.35 -1.51  0.355 
(4.28) 
-55.55 -2.19  0.278 
(3.19) 
-61.41 -2.32 
              
Few covariates  0.299 
(5.57) 
-33.60 1.71  0.339 
(5.66) 
-31.33 0.92  0.255 
(3.52) 
-43.95 -1.28 
              
29<age<50  0.166 
(3.56) 
-33.39 1.88  0.196 
(3.85) 
-30.87 1.17  0.177 
(2.48) 
-40.47 -0.80 





-30.64 -0.66  0.109 
(2.69) 
-30.10 0.24  0.213 
(3.07) 
-40.80 -2.43 
              
Notes: Few covariates mean inclusion of the tax variables, the trends, age squared and the year dummies. See also notes to Table 3.   24
Comparisons with Conventional Specifications 
We now turn to a comparison with results that are based on the traditional difference 
specification as given by eqs. (6) and (7) above. To implement this specification, we follow 
the common practice of instrumenting the net-of-tax rate in year t by means of income in year 








it y −  is 
predicted income for year t. The relevant instrument in the difference specification thus 
becomes 
,
11 1 (; ) (;)
PP t
it it t it t nn yzn yz −− − Δ= − . The use of  1 it y −  as an instrument is valid as long as 
there is no first-order autocorrelation in  it v . 
 
The results are displayed in Table 7. The three first columns correspond to eq. (6), whereas 
the remaining columns include lagged income and thus correspond to model (7).
22 The 
estimated coefficients on the net-of-tax variables range between 0.08 and 0.11 in the first 
three columns. This is roughly one third of the (long-run) magnitudes estimated in the 
dynamic model and presented in Table 3. Note however that there is severe first-order 
autocorrelation in the residuals, a fact that casts doubts on the validity of this model. 
 
      Table 7. Estimation results, conventional difference specifications, gender-pooled sample. 













           












          






          
AR(1)  -31.47 -29.92  -41.40 -18.31 -17.33  -21.77 
          
AR(2)  -13.67 -13.54  -19.94  2.69  1.95  7.23 
          
Obs.  624,300 624,497  592,079 624,300 624,497  592,079 
          
        Notes: Other variables are those included in the previous regressions (except  1 it n − Δ  and  1 it y − Δ ). 
 
 
The estimates of the net-of-tax effects are markedly reduced when lagged income is included 
among the regressors. The coefficients on the lagged income variables are negative, which is 
                                                 
22 We include the same controls for income trends as in the previous regressions. The estimated coefficients are 
only marginally affected by exclusion of these trend variables.   25
the common finding in these kinds of specifications. Again, there is evidence of severe first-
order autocorrelation in the residuals. 
 
As noted, the dynamic specification nests the conventional formulation (for one year 
differences) as a special case; the relevant restrictions on eq. (4) are  2 0 β ρ = = . These 
restrictions are almost always rejected:  0 ρ =  is always rejected as is clear from the tables; 
2 0 β = , which implies equal coefficients on 
2
it n Δ  and  1 it n − Δ , is rejected for assessed and total 
income but not for earned income.
23 
 
5.3 Fiscal Consequences of a Tax Cut 
A frequently advocated tax reform would entail abolishment of the top bracket in the state 
income tax system.
24 Such a reform, involving a 5 percentage cut in marginal income tax rates 
for top-income earners, would restore the Swedish tax system to the basic principles set out in 
the major tax reform of the early 1990s. 
 
What are the fiscal consequences of such a reform? Consider a stylized representation of the 
tax system pertaining to high incomes, i.e., incomes above the threshold where the top rate 
kicks in. Let τ  represent the statutory marginal income tax rate,  i YA  assessed income for 
individual i, D deductions and 
* Y  the threshold above which the top rate applies. Taxable 
income is given as  ii YT YA D = − , where deductions are constant for top-income earners. The 




ii TY A D Y τ =− −  
 










=− − +  
 
                                                 
23 For the gender-pooled sample, the t-values for the restriction are 5.44 and 5.53, respectively. For earned 
income we have t=0.75. 
24 Two of the three major Swedish union federations, organizing white collar workers, have repeatedly argued in 
favor of such a reform.    26
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where ln / ln(1 ) i dY A d η τ ≡−  is the elasticity of assessed income with respect to the net-of-
tax rate. The expression in the first parenthesis captures the direct (or mechanical) effect of a 
tax change, whereas the remaining term represents the indirect effect associated with the 
income response. Note that the direct effect is negligible for incomes close to the threshold so 
/0 i dT dτ <  holds for incomes in the neighborhood of the threshold. 
 
Expression (10) captures only the impact on tax revenues that operates through the income tax 
system whereas revenue effects via payroll and value added taxes are ignored. By slightly 
modifying (8) so as to incorporate proportional payroll taxes levied on employers, 
e τ , we 
obtain an expression that captures the total change in labor taxes associated with a change in 
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Table 8 shows the results of experiments where the top tax bracket is abolished in 2002, the 
last year in our data. We set  0.525 τ =  and  0.33
e τ =  (or  0
e τ = ) in these experiments.
 25 
Three alternatives for η  are considered, viz. 0.10, 0.20 and 0.30. The exercises indicate that 
                                                 
25 This experiment involves calculation of  ( ) ()
* ( )/(1 ) 0.05
e
ii i TY A D Y Y A ηττ τ ⎡⎤ Δ= Σ − − − + − × − ⎣⎦ . The 
summation pertains to all income earners above the relevant income threshold. The numbers are scaled to the 
macro level by dividing by the sample probability in LINDA, i.e., 0.0335. The calculations ignore the fact that τ  
varies across individuals (because of variations in municipality tax rates), but this has negligible effects on the 
results. The average marginal income tax rate was 55 percent in 2002 in the relevant top income interval. The 
proportional statutory payroll tax rate was 32.82 percent. We place no age restrictions on age in the calculations.   27
an elimination of the top bracket is fiscally inexpensive. The mechanical fall in tax revenues 
is more than offset by the increase in tax revenues associated with the positive income 
response for  0.20 η =  or higher and with account taken of revenues from the payroll tax. For 
the most “elasticity-optimistic” case, the income-driven increase in tax revenues is over 80 
percent bigger than negative direct revenue effect. It should be noted that these calculations 
probably provide lower bound estimates since we have ignored increased revenues from value 
added taxes. 
 
Table 8. Fiscal implications of elimination of the top tax bracket ( 0.05 τ Δ =− ) in 2002. 
Millions SEK. 
 0.10 η =  0.20 η =  0.30 η =  






























           
Net effect:  T Δ   -1,810 -1,120  -710  670  390  2,460 
Notes: (i) ignores the payroll tax effect whereas (ii) incorporates the payroll tax effect. No age restrictions are 
imposed. The SEK/USD exchange rate in 2007 is around 7 SEK per USD.  
 
 
Finally, we note by inspection of (12) that the tax cut has no effect on tax revenues provided 























The numerator of the left-hand side is the sum of taxable incomes above the threshold for the 
top rate, whereas the denominator is the sum of (all) assessed incomes for individuals above 
the threshold. The left-hand side is equal to 0.29 in our data. For  0.525 τ =  and  0
e τ = , it 
follows that  0.262 η >  must hold if the tax reform should be revenue neutral. For  0.33
e τ = , it 
is sufficient that  0.161 η >  holds. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
We have proposed a new approach to the estimation of income responses to changes in 
marginal tax rates. The conventional approach, where changes in income are regressed on 
changes in tax rates, can only capture long-run responses under restrictive and implausible 
conditions. Our more general approach, which involves application of a standard lagged 
adjustment framework, nests the conventional specification as a special case and delivers 
estimates of both short-run and long-run effects. 
 
Our estimates of long-run responses are much larger than the estimates we obtain by 
employing the conventional difference specifications. At the same time, these long-run 
estimates are considerably smaller than some of the previous estimates in the literature. 
However, our simulations of a tax reform that abolishes the top marginal tax rate suggest that 
even modest elasticities are sufficient to make such a reform fiscally inexpensive; in fact, the 
reform may well bring about a fiscal surplus when we account for induced increases in 
revenues from payroll taxes and value added taxes. 
 
The results for men are more robust than those we have obtained for women. There is no 
evidence from our results that female incomes are more responsive than those of men, an 
implication that would follow from most studies of labor supply.
26 However, the tax changes 
we have studied have affected many more men than women since they have been targeted at 
high-income earners. It should therefore generally be easier to identify behavioral responses 
among men than among women. 
 
There is a need for better understanding of how and why the estimates differ across alternative 
definitions of income. Much has been said in favor of the view that one should focus on 
taxable income since this is what matters for the effects on the government’s tax revenues. 
But perhaps this focus misses the difficulty to satisfactory model income variables that are 
complex outcomes of individual work effort as well as rules pertaining to tax deductions and 
transfers. It may well be that separate structural approaches to the modeling of the 
components of taxable income will prove to be the route forward. 
 
                                                 
26 However, Blomquist and Hansson Brusewitz (1990) caution that the conventional results – higher female 
labor supply elasticities – may be artifacts of restrictive functional forms.    29
The paper has focused on individual responses and ignored the household context. For 
married (or cohabiting) individuals, the economic fortunes of both partners are presumably 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Effective marginal tax rates 
Taxable income is obtained after various deductions from gross income. A stylized 
description of the tax system runs as follows. Let T denote the amount of income taxes paid, 
τ  the statutory marginal tax rate, Y broad (or gross) income, D the basic deduction, F the 
social security fee and R other deductions (such as work related deductions). The tax function 
can be written as: 
 
(A1)  [ ]00,02 () ( 1 ) TY D d F R a F d F τ =− − − + − −  
 
The first parenthesis represents taxable income, i.e., YT Y D dF R = −− −, where d is the 
fraction of the fee that is deductible and a the fraction of the fee that is equivalent to a tax, i.e., 
the non-actuarial element of the fee. The expression in square brackets capture some changes 
of tax policy during the period 2000-2002, where tax cuts were linked to the social security 
fees. Up to 1999, d=1 applied; in 2000, d was reduced to 0.75; in 2001 it was further reduced 
to 0.5 and in the following year d=0.25 applied. The social security fee includes a pension fee 
that is associated with future pension entitlements. 
 
The basic deduction depends on the level of income in a hump-shaped fashion: 
/0 . 2 5 DY ∂∂ =  applies up to an income limit; D is then constant over a range of (low) 
incomes; and there is a subsequent interval where  /0 . 1 0 DY ∂ ∂= −  applies. D is constant for 
relatively high incomes.
27 The marginal increase in the social security fee associated with an 
increase in income,  / F Y ∂∂ , is constant up to an income threshold beyond which it is zero.
28 
The caps on the fees have kicked in at the 85
th to the 90
th percentiles of broad income. 
 
Derivation of the tax function yields the effective marginal tax rate as: 
 





∂∂ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡⎤ =− +−− − ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎣⎦ ∂∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
                                                 
27 The basic deduction is equal to the level of assessed income for very low levels of assessed income. In other 
words, there is an exemption level in the tax system, such that only incomes above that level are subject to 
taxation. 
28 D is determined by assessed income whereas F is determined by broad income. We assume that a given 
marginal increase in broad income translates into an increase in assessed income of the same magnitude.    33
The contribution of the social security fee to the effective marginal tax rate is small. We have 
/0 FY ∂∂ =  for 1991 and 1992;  / FY ∂∂  then increases gradually from 0.0095 in 1993 up to 
0.07 in 2000. However, this increase is partly or wholly offset by deduction rules and the fact 
that the fee is associated with pension entitlements. The size of the non-actuarial component 
of the pension fee is debatable, but a=0.5 seems to be a reasonable estimate. All in all, the 
social security fee has a negligible impact on changes in the effective marginal tax rate. 
 
Table A1 shows estimation results where the effective marginal tax rate includes the basic 
deduction, i.e., the effective marginal tax rate is defined as  (1 / )
e DY ττ ≡ +∂ ∂ , where τ  is the 
statutory tax rate. The effective net-of-tax rate is thus  ln(1 )
e
it it n τ =− . As instruments, in 
addition to those applied in the main text, we use two variables capturing the rules for the 
basic deduction.
29 The estimates of the long-run elasticity range between 0.17 and 0.20, thus 
somewhat lower than those shown in the main text. 
 
       Table A1. Estimation results with effective tax rates, gender-pooled sample. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Assessed  income  Broad  income Earned  income 
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AR(1)  -34.48 -32.74  -44.37 
      
AR(2)  2.14 1.38  -1.01 
      
Obs.  620,784 621,144  585,234 
      Note: See explanations in the text and notes to Table 3. 
 
 
                                                 
29 The two variables are  ,
2 ln 1 ( ; )
pp t
t it it DD Y A d −
⎡⎤ ′ =− ⎣⎦  and  ,1
1 12 ln 1 ( ; )
pp t
t it it DD Y A d
−
− −−
⎡ ⎤ ′ =− ⎣ ⎦ , where  t d  captures 
the rules for the basic deduction pertaining to year t. In words, we use assessed income in year t-2, inflated to 



















          
1991 170,000 20  26.2       
1992 186,600 20  20.6       
1993 190,600 20  20.6       
1994 198,700 20  22.5       
1995 203,900 25  19.2       
1996 209,100 25  20.0       
1997 209,100 25  22.0       
1998 213,100 25  22.8       
1999  219,300  20 23.8  360,000  25 5.2 
2000  232,600  20 24.3  374,000  25 5.7 
2001  252,000  20 23.1  390,400  25 6.1 
2002  273,800  20 21.1  414,200  25 5.8 
Note: The thresholds refer to taxable income in nominal SEK beyond which the state tax kicks in. The fraction 
of affected tax payers refer to individuals aged 20-59 with positive taxable incomes. 
 
Table B2. Sample characteristics (means). 
 1991  1996  2002 
















































Obs. 154,183  160,236  161,848 
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